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Abstract: Many consumer goods - sugar, cigarettes, alcohol, fossil fuels - are considered
sin goods as they cause externalities like CO2 emissions or internalities such as addiction.
The standard response is then to appeal to the Pigouvian principle and tax these goods to
correct these ex- and internalities.
This paper builds on this fundamental Pigouvian insight but argues that the effectiveness
of the traditional approach is limited. The main reason is that in many cases, close substitutes
are missing, which provide similar benefits to the consumer but are less harmful. As a result
behavior does not change and the fiscal intervention is regressive.
We then make two points. First, if those substitutes exist, then a differential fiscal
policy which directs consumer behavior from the sin good to the less harmful substitute
complements the pure Pigouvian approach. We survey the nascent empirical literature on
this topic and find that this differential approach is promising.
Second, if those substitutes do not exist, then a commitment to implement a differential
fiscal policy (fiscal forward guidance) in the future (not now) will induce innovations today
and finally deliver a substitute in the future.
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1 Introduction
Many consumer goods - sugar, cigarettes, alcohol, alcohol, fossil fuels - are considered sin
goods as they cause externalities like CO2 emissions or internalities such as addiction, for
example as a result of self control problems for smokers. The standard response is then to
appeal to the Pigouvian principle and tax these goods to correct these ex- and internalities.
This paper builds on this fundamental Pigouvian insight but argues that the effectiveness
of the traditional approach is limited. The main reason is that in many cases close substitutes
are missing, which provide similar benefits to the consumer but are less harmful. As a result
behavior does not change in the desired way and the fiscal intervention is regressive. Either
consumption of the sin good is not reduced and if it is lowered then the burden of reduction is
on low-income households who cannot afford the higher taxes. Consumption of an alternative
less harmful substitute is largely unchanged.
This paper aims at adding two points to this discussion. First, if a close substitute
for the traditional sin good exists, then a differential fiscal policy which directs consumer
behavior from the sin good to the less harmful substitute complements the pure Pigouvian
approach. A differential fiscal policy makes the traditional sin good less attractive and the
new good more attractive. An example would be a tax increase of the traditional good -
a car with a high CO2 emission - and a subsidy or a tax decrease on the new good, for
example electric cars. We first derive the theoretical properties of a differential fiscal policy.
We show when it works and point out some caveats in the design of such a policy. We then
survey the nascent empirical literature on this topic and find that this differential approach
is promising and successful in inducing consumers to switch from the traditional to the new
good. Specifically we consider three markets, which differ with respect to the availability
of substitutes. The market for cigarettes is a market where a close substitute exists as e-
cigarettes are close substitutes for traditional cigarettes. The empirical literature finds that
an increase in the tax on e-cigarettes leads to a quite strong substitution from e-cigarettes to
traditional cigarettes or equivalently that fewer people switch from traditional to e-cigarettes
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than would have in the absence of the e-cigarette tax increase. The empirical literature on the
taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages also confirms our theoretical predictions. Households
substitute from taxed to untaxed goods. However, the design of the tax was not ideal as it
did not tax sugar independently of the type of consumption good but exempted for example
sugary fruit juices from taxation but taxed diet drinks. As a result, while calorie usage was
not reduced significantly, the presence of consumer switching suggests that a better designed
policy could be successful in reducing calories through inducing substitution. The third
market concerns the CO2 reduction, which turns out to be the most difficult one to induce
substitution due to the absence of close substitutes. One stark example is the high taxation
of fuel in Germany which renders the usage of combustion engine cars significantly more
expensive without having induced significant substitution towards CO2-emission reduced
cars, simply because these cars are not considered close substitutes by consumers. The
market for electricity provides some evidence for substitution as a CO2 tax lead to a coal
usage reduction in electricity generation in Great Britain from 40% in 2013 to 3% in 2019.
Our second point addresses markets, where close substitutes do not exist. For such mar-
kets we show that a commitment to implement a differential fiscal policy (fiscal forward
guidance) in the future (not now) will induce innovations today and finally deliver a substi-
tute in the future. We develop an innovation model building on the seminal contributions of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) and in particular of Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997). In this model firms decide whether to invest in developing new less
harmful goods. A key variable determining their efforts is the potential profits that they
expect in the future. These profits in turn are proportional to the market size of the new
good in the future. This is where our two points are connected. A commitment to implement
differential regulation in the future will enlarge the demand and thus the market size of the
new good in the future. Firms today anticipate this and as a response start innovating.
Differential fiscal policy and innovation are complements which reinforce each other. The
larger is the future market for less harmful goods, the stronger are firms innovation incen-
tives today. Policy makers should therefore consider to foster a large market for new goods
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even though the market size might seem too large ex-post. For example, a commitment to
a large market for electric cars will foster innovation in electric cars but such a policy might
increase the total number of future cars. However, although the number of future cars could
increase, the number of cars with combustion engines has decreased, but by less than the
increase in electric cars.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. It features two stages.
In the second stage both the sin good and a substitute are available. The first stage is an
innovation stage where firms invest into R&D taking into account consumer behavior and
policy actions in stage 2. Section 3 shows theoretically that in the second stage where both
the sin good and a substitute are available that a differential regulation will induce consumer
switching. We do not stop at this simple theoretical insight but also address the essential
question whether this theory work in practice. We therefore discuss several empirical papers
in this nascent area which in our view apply the highest methodological standards. We find
that differential fiscal policy, i.e. mainly differential taxation, works and that the empirical
and theoretical results are in line. Section 4 then develops the fiscal policy forward guidance
principle for consumer markets. We show that a commitment to differential regulation in
Stage 2 will induce innovations in Stage 1 which eventually deliver a substitute which is close
enough to make consumers switch and at the same time is harmless or less harmful than the
sin good. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this Section we lay out a standard innovation model. There are two types of goods.
A traditional good - for example a high CO2 emission good - without any room for further
improvement and thus without any innovative activity. And a second new good - for example
a low or zero CO2 emission good - with room for improvement and thus innovative activity.
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2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and for simplicity there are only two periods. The first period is the innova-
tion period and households consume in the second period. The environment for the variety of
goods is similar to but more general than the basic models in Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). For analytical tractability, there is a continuum of goods
i ∈ [0, 1]. The traditional goods are indexed with i ∈ [0, α) and their quality is fixed and thus
innovation is ruled out. We make this stark and somewhat unrealistic assumption to focus on
the large difference in innovative possibilities between traditional and new goods. Allowing
for a small amount of innovation in traditional goods would not affect our conclusions. In
contrast, the quality of new goods i ∈ [α, 1] can be improved through innovation. The mod-
eling and the cost of innovation follow the groundbreaking work of Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997). In addition to consuming the traditional and the new good - for example cars with
combustion engines or with emission free engines - there is also a general consumption good
c, including for example food and housing.
Household Problem. The representative household has an (experienced) utility function
and maximizes:3
max
1
1− σ
(∫ α
0
qix
−1

i di+
∫ 1
α
qiy
−1

i di
) 
−1 (1−σ)
+ c
s.t.
∫ α
0
(1 + τx) pixidi+
∫ 1
α
(1 + τy) piyidi+ c = m.
where xi are the traditional goods and yi are the (potential) new goods. We assume (later)
 > 1, that is traditional and new goods are substitutes to capture that both goods provide
3This is the utility perceived by the household, that is s/he maximizes this function. The true utility
function could be different (Farhi and Gabaix, 2020). Our positive and not normative focus does not allow
us to take a stand on whether the true and the experienced utility functions are different or not.
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similar services to consumers while one has negative externalities and the other does not.
The price of the traditional good xi is pi with quality qi. The price of the new good yi is pi
with quality qi. Traditional goods are taxed at rate τx while new goods are taxed at rate τy.
The price of the numeraire good c is normalized to one and m are the available household
resources. The assumption of a representative household is standard in the innovation liter-
ature and allowing for a (realistic amount of) heterogeneity would complicate our analysis
but not affect our conclusions.
Household demand Before formulating the firm problem, we first have to solve the max-
imization problem to derive households demand functions. Denote therefore aggregated
consumption of the x− y goods as
Z =
(∫ α
0
qix
−1

i di+
∫ 1
α
qiy
−1

i di
) 
−1
so that the first-order conditions (FOC) are:
/∂xi :Z
−σZ
1
 qix
− 1

i = (1 + τx) pi,
/∂yi :Z
−σZ
1
 qiy
− 1

i = (1 + τy) pi.
This implies that
y
− 1

i =
(1 + τi) pi
qi
Z−
1
Zσ
such that the the demand function for yi is
yi =
(
(1 + τy) pi
qi
)−
Z1−σ .= p¯−i Z
1−σ,
where aggregate quality adjusted demand Z is taken as given by firm i and we define the
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adjusted price
p¯i =
(1 + τy) pi
qi
.
Since  > 0, the demand for good yi is decreasing in the adjusted price p¯i, implying that it
is decreasing in the tax τy and the price pi and increasing in the quality qi.
Firm Problem First, given the quality qi, firm i solves the following maximization problem
choosing optimal price (and therefore demand), given the demand function, τi and Z:
max
pi
piyi (pi, qi)− ψyi (pi, qi) .
Second, firm i decides whether to innovate or not. Following Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
we assume that the cost of innovation for product i ∈ [α, 1] is an increasing function of i:
fi = df (i− α) ,
and the outcome of innovation is that the quality increases from q to λq, where λ is the
step of quality improvement. This cost function captures the fact that some products are
more expensive to innovate, and the aggregate innovation continuously increases if the profits
of innovative firms increase due to favorable changes in innovation subsidy, tax policies or
demand.
We first solve the firm's optimal choice of the price pi and then derive the innovation
decision through comparing the costs and benefits of innovation. First, the optimal pricing
problem of firm i with quality qi,
pi (qi) = max
pi
pi
(
(1 + τi) pi
qi
)−
Z1−σ − ψ
(
(1 + τi) pi
qi
)−
Z1−σ,
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gives the FOC
yi + (pi − ψ) (−) yi
pi
= 0
which is equivalent to the standard markup rule
pi =

− 1ψ,
where ε = −dyi/yi
dpi/pi
is the price elasticity of demand for yi, capturing the percentage demand
change of yi in response to a price change pi. Then we can calculate the profit given the
optimal price:
pi (qi) = (pi − ψ) yi
=
1
− 1ψ
(
(1 + τi)

−1ψ
qi
)−
Z1−σ
= dpi (1 + τi)
− qiZ
1−σ,
where dpi = 
− (− 1)−1 ψ1− is a constant. The profit evaluated at the optimal price is
positively related to the quality qi, negatively related to the tax τi, and ambiguous in the
aggregate quality adjusted demand Z (positive if σ is close to zero and utility function is
almost linear in Z, as in the classic innovation literature, and negative if σ is large).
Second, the firm decides whether to innovate by comparing the cost and benefit:
pi (λq)− df (i− α) ≥ pi (q)⇒
dpi (1 + τi)
− Z1−σ (λ− 1) q ≥ df (i− α)⇒
i ≤ α + dI (1 + τi)− Z1−σ
8
where dI = dpi (λ− 1) q/df is a constant. We find that the innovation incentives are
negatively related to the tax τi and ambiguous in the aggregate quality adjusted demand Z.
We can summarize the solution for firm i producing yi conditional on Z. It charges a
price
pi =

− 1ψ,
the innovation choice leads to qualities
qi =
{
λq if i ≤ α + dI (1 + τi)− Z1−σ
q if i > α + dI (1 + τi)
− Z1−σ
(1)
and the demand for good yi is
yi =
(
(1 + τi) pi
qi
)−
Z1−σ
=

(
(1+τi)

−1ψ
λq
)−
Z1−σ if i ≥ α + dI (1 + τi)− Z1−σ(
(1+τi)

−1ψ
q
)−
Z1−σ if i < α + dI (1 + τi)
− Z1−σ,
(2)
A firm which produces good xi also charges a price
pi =

− 1ψ,
and produces (
(1 + τx)

−1ψ
qx
)−
Z1−σ
with quality qi = qx.
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Equilibrium Assume that the tax rate τy is the same for all y goods, and τx is the same for
all x goods, then the aggregate innovation can be summarized by the innovation cutoff iI :
qi =
{
λq if i < iI
q if i ≥ iI .
where iI = α + dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ.
3 Differential Fiscal Policy: Theory and Evidence
In this Section we first explore the theoretical implications of a differential tax and other
regulatory policies on the consumption choices of households in stage 2. Note that our
analysis is positive and not normative since we made no assumption on how agents' perceived
utility is related to a social welfare function. In the second step we provide an overview of
empirical work corroborating our theoretical findings.
3.1 Theory
Our theory shows that the aggregate consumption of the traditional goods equals
X := α
(
(1 + τx)

−1ψ
qx
)−
Z1−σ
and consumption of new goods equals
Y := (I∗ − α)
(
(1 + τy)

−1ψ
λqy
)−
Z1−σ + (1− I∗)
(
(1 + τy)

−1ψ
qy
)−
Z1−σ,
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where I∗ is the innovation decision in the first state which is taken as given here. The
quality is equal to qx for all traditional goods and equal to qy for all new goods. The relative
consumption of new to traditional goods is thus equal to:
Y
X
=
(I∗ − α)
(
(1+τy)

−1ψ
λqy
)−
+ (1− I∗)
(
(1+τy)

−1ψ
qy
)−
α
(
(1+τx)

−1ψ
qx
)− (3)
=
(
(I∗ − α)
α
λ +
1− I∗
α
)(
1 + τy
1 + τx
qx
qy
)−
(4)
The substitution effects between X and Y consumption can be summarized through the
wedge
ω =
1 + τy
1 + τx
qx
qy
.
An increase in the wedge leads to substitution from Y to X, and a decrease of the wedge
induces the desired substitution from X to Y . The consequences for tax policy, which aims
at decreasing the wedge, are clear. Both an increase in the tax on the traditional good and a
decrease in the tax on the new good accomplish this. This is intuitive. If the traditional good
gets more expensive relative to the new good then households substitute away. Similarly, an
increase in the quality of the new good qy relative to the traditional good quality qx decreases
the wedge and induces substitution. Example of relative quality increases are preferential
parking for electric cars but not for combustion engines cars and allowing flavors, such as
menthol, in e-cigarettes but not in traditional cigarettes.
Result 1. [Substitution through Regulation/policies: Substitution]
- The substitution effects from regulation can be summarized through the wedge ω =(
1+τy
1+τx
qx
qy
)
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- A decrease in the tax ratio 1+τy
1+τx
induces a substitution from traditional to new goods.
- A decrease in the quality ratio qx
qy
induces a substitution from traditional to new goods.
The interpretation of the results should be clear by now. All that matters is the difference
induced through regulation and taxes between the two goods. From a theoretical perspective
it is inessential in this simple framework what exactly causes this difference.
While the previous result is in line with standard intuition, we want to point out a
potential caveat for implementing such a policy right away. While the substitution channel
is straightforward, the total effect of a change in taxes or regulation is more involved since
one has to consider the effect on the aggregate quality adjusted demand Z. Consider for
example an increase in the tax τx on the traditional good. It is possible that the consumption
of the new good shrinks although the tax increase leads to a substitution towards the new
good, simply because the market size shrinks. Then consumption of both the traditional and
new good fall, where the first falls more than the latter because of the substitution effect. A
naive policy might therefore have counterproductive effects. In a different scenario, however,
the increase in τx might lead to an increase in Y . The increase in Y might even be so strong
that the total demand X + Y increases, that is the increase in Y is larger than the fall in
X. Such a scenario would arise if the incentives to substitute between X and Y goods are
strong - σ is large. Households might then substitute one X item for more than one Y item.
For example, households might switch from medium-sized combustion engine cars to larger
electric cars. Others might buy an electric car who did not own a car before.
A policy that is successful in increasing consumption of the new good Y and reducing
consumption of the traditional good X might thus lead to an increase in total consumption
X+Y . In the case of the tobacco market this would mean more alternative nicotine products
are consumed, fewer traditional cigarettes are smoked but total nicotine consumption goes
up. In the automobile market, we would observe more electric cars, fewer combustion engines
cars but the total number of cars increasing. Theoretically, an increase in τx could lead to a
decrease in X and at the same time to an increase in Y which outweighs the decrease in x
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such that X + Y increases.
Example It is easy to find examples which feature this behavior. Fix parameters:  = 2,
α = 0.6, q = 1, λ = 2, σ = 3 and ψ = 1 and consider fixing iI = I
∗ = 2/3 such that
(iI − α)λ + 1 − iI = α, i.e., X and Y sectors are of the same size. This can be achieved
by adjusting innovation cost df . Setting τx = 60% and τy = 10% then Z = 0.7721 and
X + Y = 5.3237. If τx is increased to 65%, while keeping iI fixed, then Z = 0.7689 and
X + Y = 5.3309. This means that aggregate quality adjusted demand Z falls while the total
number of items sold, X + Y , increases.
We summarize the caveats in a result.
Result 2. [Caveat: Total Effect]
- An increase in τx or τy decreases X and Y consumption if σ is smaller than 1/ but
bounded away from 0.
- An increase in τx decreases X and increases Y consumption if σ is large. And might
even increase X + Y .
- An increase in τy decreases Y and increases X consumption if σ is large. And might
even increase X + Y .
There are two possible responses to this caveat. If the naive policy leads to a reduction
in both X and Y , households utility falls. One policy option is to ensure that households'
perceived utility is unchanged, that is Z is unaffected. Such a policy requires for example
increasing τx and decreasing τy or increasing qy at the same time. As a result consumption
of X falls and Y consumption increases.
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Result 3. [Effects of Regulation/policies: Total Effect - I]
If the change in taxes/regulation keeps the aggregate quality adjusted demand Z unchanged
then
- A decrease in the tax ratio 1+τy
1+τx
induces a reduction in traditional and an increase in
new goods.
- A decrease in the quality ratio qx
qy
induces a reduction in traditional and an increase in
new goods.
An alternative strategy would be to design the policy to keep the number of items sold,
X + Y , unchanged. This means that the policy change ensures that the number of items
sold does not change and each additional Y good sold means one less X good sold.
Result 4. [Effects of Regulation/policies: Total Effect - II]
A combination of changes in τx and τy can be designed which keeps X + Y constant,
decreases X and increases Y .
3.2 Empirical Results
This Section provides empirical evidence using three different products to substantiate our
main theoretical result that differential taxation induces substitution from the traditional
good to the new good. The three different product categories are characteristic of the effects
of sin taxes. The product categories differ in the availability of a close substitute, where
we emphasize again that being a close substitute is viewed from the consumer's perspective.
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Tobacco taxation is a category with a close substitute since alternative nicotine delivery
systems that are likely to be significantly less harmful exist
The second category has good substitutes, but the implemented policy design is subop-
timal. Highly sweetened sodas have good substitutes, but the regulation was imperfect and
had unintended substitutes, that is, unintended from a policy maker's perspective whose in-
tention was calorie intake. But unsurprising given our theoretical framework which predicts
that consumers substitute towards close, untaxed substitutes.
The third category is one without substitutes or only imperfect ones. For cars, CO2
emission has no proper substitutes as alternative engines are not quite ready to be substitutes
for combustion engines. For electricity, the substitutes for coal are imperfect or not carbon-
free.
3.2.1 Taxation of Sugar-sweetened Beverages
We first consider sugar-sweetened beverages and their taxation. This is a type of sin taxation
that leads to substitution effects as described by our theory. However, at the same time, the
tax is not ideally designed, and the substitution effects are therefore not as desired.
Taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages have been introduced in several countries including,
the USA, Denmark and France. From a methodological perspective the US is the most
attractive country. Taxes in the US are introduced at a local level, for example at the city
level in Philadelphia or Berkeley, such that neighboring areas without a tax can serve as
a control group. Comparing the consumption response in Philadelphia and its neighboring
areas will then identify the causal effect of introducing a tax on soda. Obviously, this is not
possible if the tax had been introduced nationwide since there would be no control group.
Seiler et al. (2019) use a panel dataset covering beverage sales in several hundred stores
in Philadelphia, including small convenience and wholesale stores. The methodology used
is a difference-in-difference approach. This methodology compares the consumption before
and after the introduction of the tax in Philadelphia. However, this is not sufficient since
consumption might have changed for other reasons unrelated to the tax increase, for exam-
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ple a trend towards more healthy behavior. The authors therefore compare the Philadelphia
consumption response to the response of stores located at least 6 miles outside of Philadel-
phia. The (standard) assumption is that the health trend is the same in Philadelphia as in
its suburbs and that the tax change is the only relevant difference between the two regions
over time.4
The Philadelphia tax covers all sugar-sweetened beverages except for sweetened milk
products and 100 percent fruit juices. In particular, diet drinks are also taxed. For the
interpretation of the results it is important to note that there is not full pass-through,
meaning that the tax incidence is not fully on customers.
The main finding in Seiler et al. (2019) is that the sugar-sweetened beverages sales
dropped by 46% after levying the tax. However, there is substantial tax avoidance as pur-
chases outside the city of Philadelphia increased at the same time, implying a net decrease
in Philadelphia and its surrounding area of 22%. Roberto et al. (2019) estimate a 38%
quantity reduction after taking into account cross-shopping, which is larger and statistically
different from Seiler et al. (2019). The main reason seems to be that Roberto et al. (2019)
use a non-representative sample. Indeed, when Seiler et al. (2019) estimate a 36% quantity
reduction when restricting to the non-representative sample in Roberto et al. (2019).
While a 22% drop due to the tax increase appears to be a success, taking a closer look at
the data reveals some unpleasant details. Consumers tended to cut down on drinks at the
lower end of the calorie spectrum, such as sports drinks, but did not change their consumption
of bottled water. Sales of sports drinks, which are taxed but relatively low-calorie, decreased
by about 36%. However, the sales of natural juices increased by 9%. These drinks have
a high sugar content but are exempted from the tax since the sugar is not added and the
drinks do not contain any sweeteners.
The aim of the tax is to reduce the number of calories consumed. The success in this
respect is limited. Counting the total change in calories shows a fall by 16%, but this change
is not statistically significant. In other words the hypothesis that the tax had no effect on
4Note that this assumption does not preclude permanent differences between the surrounding counties
and Philadelphia.
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calorie consumption can not be rejected.
What does this mean in light of our theory? We interpret the results as supporting
our idea that people respond to tax incentives and change their behavior accordingly. As
predicted by our theory, they substitute away from taxed goods towards non-taxed goods. Or
if both goods are taxed, households substitute towards the good with higher sugar content.
The lesson of this natural tax experiment is that changing customers' behavior requires a
carefully designed tax system. Otherwise the result is a convolution of desired and undesired
substitution effects. Instead of taxing drinks with high and low amounts of added sugar
at the same rate and exempting other sugary drinks, sugar should be taxed independently
of the type of consumption good. This would avoid the undesired substitution behavior
observed in Philadelphia; consumers would substitute from high to low sugar goods and the
calorie reduction objective is more likely to be met.
3.2.2 Taxation of Novel Tobacco/Nicotine Products
The nascent literature on the taxation and regulation of traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes
is growing fast.5 This is hardly surprising since the cigarette market provides a good labora-
tory to test the effects of taxes on substitution, tax incidence and tax evasion simply because
traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes are quite close substitutes, particularly because they
both provide nicotine to the consumers. We are, however, not assessing how less harmful
e-cigarettes and other nicotine products are compared to than traditional cigarettes. We are
only interested in the substitution effects due to tax changes.
Minnesota was the first state in the USA to introduce a tax on e-cigarettes. On August 1,
2010 Minnesota introduced an initial tax rate of 35 percent, followed by another 60 percentage
points on July 1, 2013, increasing the total tax rate by 95 percent. Saffer et al. (2019) follow
Abadie et al. (2010) and apply a synthetic control design to measure the causal effect of
this introduction of a tax on e-cigarettes on smoking behavior. The idea is to compare
5For example Cotti et al. (2020), DeCicca et al. (2020), Pesko et al. (2019), Buckell et al. (2017), Dave
et al. (2017) Kenkel et al. (2017)
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Table 2 
     Effect of the MN E-cigarette Tax on Smoking 
DD: MN vs. Synthetic MN 
Model type Data Coefficient of 
the treatment  
variable 
Standard  
Error 
t-value P-value 
DL1 Levels 0.9264*** 0.2094 4.42    0.004  
DL2 Wave Differences  0.8449**    0.3250  2.60    0.048   
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Figure 1: Figure 5 from Saffer et al. (2019): Smoking behavior in Minnesota and the rest of
the US
the smoking behavior in Minnesota and the rest of the USA using a difference-in-difference
approach. The key assumption of the difference-in-difference approach is that Minnesota
and the rest of the USA behaved similarly befo e the tax hike and would have continued to
be similar in the absence of a tax increase (counterfactual scenario). This means one has to
ensure to select the control group of states such that they represent a valid counterfactual
for Minnesota.
Saffer et al. (2019) follow Abadie et al. (2010) and use the synthetic control design to
ensure that Minnesota and the control group of states feature the same pre-trend, that is
they look similar before the tax introduction. The assumption is that the similarity of the
pre-trend would have continued in the absence of the tax. The effect of the tax is then
the difference in the behavior of Minnesota and the control group after the tax increase.
Saffer et al. (2019) also make the reasonable assumption that the introduction of the tax on
e-cigarettes was exogenous to the evolution of smoking behavior in Minnesota.
Figure 1 illustrates the approach. Before the tax increase, the treatment group - Min-
nesota - and the control group look identical in terms of smoking rate. After the introduction
of the tax on e-cigarettes the smoking rate decreased more in the control group than in Min-
nesota.
To relate this result to the degree of substitution, note that the relative price of e-cigs
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versus cigarettes in 2012 was almost identical in Minnesota and in the control group (0.55
vs. 0.56). After the tax increase the relative price in Minnesota increased to 0.61 while it
fell to 0.52 in the control group, that is the relative price rose by 17 percent. The result
of this change in relative prices was about an 0.9 percentage points increase in smoking
prevalence, equivalent to a 5.4 percent prevalence increase relative to the pre-tax increase
level in Minnesota.
The findings in Saffer et al. (2019) also suggest that almost all of the increase in smoking
prevalence in Minnesota is accounted for by a decrease in successful quits and there is no
change in the number of cigarettes consumed by everyday smokers. The effects on adolescents
are unclear and the gateway hypothesis is not explored in this paper.
To summarize, Saffer et al. (2019) use state-of-the-art methodology and find strong sup-
port for substitution between e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes in response to a relative
price increase induced by a tax increase in e-cigarettes. The substitution effects are presum-
ably strong since both products provide the essential good desired by the consumer, nicotine,
the ingredient that generates the addiction.
Cotti et al. (2020) reaches a similar conclusion, albeit using a somewhat weaker method-
ology. While these authors add a rich set of fixed effects which allows controlling for a
large amount of heterogeneity, their methodology does not consider potential differences in
pre-trends. Although controlling for fixed effects is an important step in avoiding biases,
differences in pre-trends might lead to biased results. The benefit of this study is that it uses
the large Nielsen Retail Scanner data from 2011 to 2017, which comprises approximately
35,000 retailers. Cotti et al. (2020) evaluates all tax changes between 2011 and 2017 whereas
Saffer et al. (2019) only uses a single state, Minnesota.
They estimate the e-cigarette own-price elasticity to be −1.5, that is the demand for
e-cigarettes falls if the price of e-cigarettes increases. The estimated cross-price elasticities
of demand between e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes shows that the two products are
substitutes. An increase in the price of e-cigarettes due to an increase in the tax on e-
cigarettes leads to an increase in the demand for traditional cigarettes. And vice versa, an
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increase in the price of traditional cigarettes increases the demand for e-cigarettes.
Both papers - Saffer et al. (2019) and Cotti et al. (2020) - thus agree on traditional and
e-cigarettes being (quite strong) substitutes.
3.2.3 Taxation of CO2 emissions
For the third type of product, CO2 taxation, the available set of substitutes is limited,
implying that the scope for taxes to induce substitution is also limited.
One stark example is fuel taxation in Germany. One liter of fuel leads to 2.37 kilogram
of CO2 so that a ton of CO2 corresponds to the burning of 422 liters. This current taxation
of fuel in Germany thus equates to a tax of about 275 Euros per ton of emitted CO2.
Apparently, this high CO2 taxation has not led to a strong substitution from combustion
engines to emission free engines. Apparently because emission free cars are not considered
close enough substitutes to conventional combustion engines cars. We discuss in Section 4 a
potential solution for overcoming the lack of a close enough substitute.
The electricity market looks more promising albeit far from being ideal in terms of avail-
able substitutes. In 2013, Great Britain implemented a carbon taxthe Carbon Price Sup-
port (CPS) without coordinating with its Europeans neighbors who did not implement
such a tax. The UCL report on international electricity trading (2019) investigated the im-
pact of the CPS on Great Britain's carbon emissions and the potential impact on cross-border
electricity trading with France and the Netherlands. The report finds that the implemen-
tation of a carbon tax caused a reduction in carbon emissions in the electricity sector, due
to a large reduction in coal generation. The numbers are quite impressive. Coal usage in
electricity generation in Great Britain fell from 40% in 2013 to 3% in 2019. This raises the
question about substitutes. The UCL report provides an answer that appears less pleasant
than the large reduction in coal usage suggests. The coal generated electricity was replaced
by imported (non-carbon free) electricity from France and the Netherlands. This supports
our theory that this taxation works because a substitute exists. The tax change was large
enough to induce the substitution away from coal to foreign produced electricity. However,
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carbon taxation in the UK is far from what our theory suggests a superior strategy to be
since carbon taxes are not equalized across different carbon emission sources.
Since the US does not have a CO2 tax, Cullen and Mansur (2017) exploit a quasi-natural
experiment in the US. There was a significant variation in natural gas prices as a result of
the shale revolution which rendered natural gas extraction cheaper and thus increased the
supply of gas which could not be exported. Cullen and Mansur (2017) assess how the price
decrease affects the electricity sector's carbon emissions and use these results to infer how a
price on CO2 would affect emissions. Cullen and Mansur (2017) find that carbon prices have
a small effect on emissions. A price of $60 per ton of carbon dioxide will reduce emissions
only by 10%.
4 Fiscal Forward Guidance
Differential regulation is successful if consumers perceive the Y good to be a close substitute
for the X good. Without such a substitute taxing for example the X good will just reduce
consumption of this good without leading to a higher Y consumption, simply because house-
holds do not assign a high value to good Y . In this Section we show how fiscal policy can be
designed to overcome this problem. We show that a smart regulation can induce innovation
in the new good Y today so that future consumers can choose between the X good and the
new close substitute Y . With innovation, differential taxation in the future will lead to the
desired consumer switching from X to Y goods.
The idea to spur innovation is quite simple and is related to what central banks do
all the time worlwide (Plosser, 2013). It has been recognized for forward guidance the
communication of future policy actions is a key ingredient of a successful monetary policy
(Plosser, 2013). This is hardly surprising since monetary policy aims (among other things) at
increasing current investment and central banks understand very well that current investment
decisions depend on future profits. The same logic not only applies to monetary but also to
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fiscal policy. Using forward guidance in fiscal policy gives clear guidance for policy to foster
innovation. Differential taxation and regulation in the future (not necessarily now) such that
the future market size for Y increases, will lead firms today to engage in more innovative
activity. The idea is the same as the one used by all central banks. Firms invest today since
they expect profits in the future. Here, for firms to invest in Y , they must expect the demand
for Y to be sufficiently high in the future. An important insight in the innovation literature
is that profits are proportional to market size since the profit per unit sold is bounded. Thus,
the larger the market is, the higher profits are, and the higher current investment in the new
technology will be. The new role of fiscal policy envisaged here is thus twofold. First, use
differential regulation to induce substitution towards Y to increase market size of Y . Second,
use this policy in the future, not necessarily now. Using differential taxation right away is
only sensible if a substitute as a result of past innovations already exists.
A straightforward implementation is increasing τx while decreasing τy to keep aggregate
quality adjusted demand Z unchanged. This result follows from our derivations of firms'
optimal innovation decision,
I∗ = iI = α + dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ.
Increasing τx decreases Z while decreasing τy lowers Z to keep it constant such that the
optimal innovation decision I∗ increases because it is decreasing in τy. The intuition is easy.
Market size Y increases since first aggregate quality adjusted demand Z is constant and the
differential policy induces a switch from X to Y .
Result 5. Increasing τx
τy
while keeping future aggregate quality adjusted demand Z constant
leads to more innovation in the new good.
Keeping Z constant is not necessary for fiscal forward guidance to work and other options
are also available. As in the previous section we want to point out however, that some
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differential policies might have unintended side effects.
One example is an increase in τx without taking any measures to make Y more attractive.
The logic is simple and builds on Result 2. An increase in τx always lowers the demand for
X. To assess the effect on innovation, we need to know the response of the Y market.
The larger the expansion of the Y market is, the larger the incentives to innovate are. The
magnitude of the Y market expansion depends (among other things) on the parameter σ,
which governs how easily households will substitute between the two goods. If σ is small,
there is little substitution and Y increases only slightly in response to a demand drop in X.
As a result, innovative activity is low and may even fall. On the other hand, if σ is large,
there is a strong substitution and a large increase in Y in response to a demand drop in X.
As a result, innovative activity increases.
Result 6. - An increase in τx decreases innovation I
∗ if σ is less than one but bounded
away from 0.
- An increase in τx increases innovation I
∗ if σ is large.
Another side effect of innovation inducing policies is, as discussed in Section 3.1, that
such a policy might lead to an expansion or reduction of the total number of items sold,
X + Y .
Example Innovation A simple example illustrates that an increase in τx which increaeses
innovations could increase or decrease X + Y . We again fix the parameters  = 2, α = 0.6,
q = 1, λ = 2, ψ = 1. Set τx = 60%, τy = 10% and df = 11.2969. In this example we allow
for an endogenous innovation response in stage 1. We consider two cases, σ = 3 and σ = 4.
In both cases innovation activity increases if τx is increases from 60% to 65%. However in
the first case, σ = 3, X + Y decreases. On the other hand in the second case, σ = 4, X + Y
increases.
This reveals an important trade-off for politicians. Ex-ante when no substitutes exist and
innovation is needed, politicians have an incentive to promise strong differential regulation
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in the future as this will expand the Y market and lead to more innovation today. Ex-post
after significant innovative activities, politicians might be interested in reducing the size of
the market X +Y , because they want to reduce nicotine consumption or the number of cars
. At that point in time, because innovation investments are sunk, the market size reduction
is not detrimental anymore. However, innovators anticipating this behavior from politicians
will respond ex-ante and will reduce innovations. The politician or planner therefore needs
some commitment power and needs to decide whether a larger market, a higher X1 + Y1
with a high Y1 and low X1 is better than a market with a smaller size X2 + Y2 but with
X2 > X1, that is more harmful goods. The options are thus between more consumption but
less harmful or less consumption but more harmful.
Our analysis in this paper not only reveals these trade-offs but could also guide the
decision making. We conclude that a properly designed policy works.
Result 7. Forward guidance (properly implemented) is effective and stimulates research in
less harmful substitutes.
5 Conclusion
It is now well understood that many consumption goods have externalities, such as CO2
emission. How can governments respond to this challenge? One of two extreme responses
would be to do nothing and let the private sector and the market deal with it. This strategy
is unlikely to be successful since it is the nature of externalities that they are not fully taken
into account by market participants without government intervention. The other extreme
is to forbid consumption of goods with externalities altogether. This is also hardly optimal
since households derive utility from consuming these goods.
This paper offers a less extreme alternative that could balance households desire for con-
sumption and the government's desire to reduce externalities. The idea is to use differential
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taxation and regulation to induce households to switch from the traditional to the new good
while at the same time preserving their utility from consumption.
Our paper offers several lessons for differential regulation.
a) Differential regulation and taxation work in theory and practice. Taxing the traditional
good more and/or the new good less induces the desired substitution towards the new
good.
b) The differential regulation has to be well designed. Taxing only the traditional good
might lead to an increase or a decrease in total consumption in this market. If this
is undesired, a combination of taxes/subsidies on the traditional and the new good is
needed.
c) A prerequisite for such a policy is however the existence of a substitute good house-
holds perceive as yielding similar utility as the traditional good. Without a reasonable
substitute taxing the traditional good is a mild form of forbidding its consumption,
mainly for low-income households. Households just reduce consumption of the tradi-
tional good when its tax is increased and cannot switch to another good with similar
perceived properties.
d) A commitment to implement a differential taxation/regulation framework in the future
- conduct forward guidance - spurs innovation today. This innovation activity will
provide the substitute in the future, which will enable the traditional good to be
substituted with a less harmful good. It is important that if a substitute is currently
unavailable, then differential taxation does not work today but a commitment to do
so in the future will.
e) The politician faces a trade-off between two scenarios. Scenario 1 involves more in-
novation, less harmful goods, more harmless goods but involves an expansion of the
market size. Scenario 2 involves less innovation, more harmful goods, fewer harmless
goods but a contraction of the market size.
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The economic approach proposed in this paper to deal with reducing consumption of sin
goods seems promising. Using differential regulation will induce this substitution and will
induce innovative activity to provide households with attractive less harmful or harmless
alternatives. However, the policies have to be designed carefully to avoid undesired side
effects which in the political process might easily be interpreted as a failure of the idea of
differential regulation while in actuality it is just a bad implementation of this idea.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Result 2
Substituting the expressions of xi and yi into Z, we obtain:
Z =
(∫ α
0
qix
−1

i di+
∫ 1
α
qiy
−1

i di
) 
−1
=
(∫ α
0
q
(
(1 + τx)

− 1ψ
)−(−1)
di+
∫ I∗
α
(λq)
(
(1 + τy)

− 1ψ
)−(−1)
di
+
∫ 1
I∗
q
(
(1 + τi)

− 1ψ
)−(−1)) −1
Z
(1−σ)(−1)


−1
= q
2
−1
(

− 1ψ
)−
Z1−σ
(
α (1 + τx)
−(−1) + ((I∗ − α)λ + 1− I∗) ((1 + τy))−(−1)
) 
−1
.
We can substitute I∗ = α + dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ to simplify (I∗ − α)λ + 1− I∗ into
(I∗ − α)λ + 1− I∗ = dI (1 + τy)− Z1−σλ + 1− α− dI (1 + τy)− Z1−σ
= dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α.
Then we can further simplify Z as
Z = q
2
−1
(

− 1ψ
)−
Z1−σ
(
α (1 + τx)
−(−1) +
(
dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α) (1 + τy)−(−1)) −1 ,
(A1)
which implies
Zσ = q
2
−1
(

− 1ψ
)− (
α (1 + τx)
−(−1) +
(
dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α) (1 + τy)−(−1)) −1 ,
(A2)
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and
Z = q

σ(−1)
(

− 1ψ
)− 1
σ (
α (1 + τx)
−(−1) +
(
dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α) (1 + τy)−(−1)) 1σ(−1) .
(A3)
Consider the impact of increasing τx on Z. Take log in equation A2, we obtain:
logZ = log
(
q

σ(−1)
(

− 1ψ
)− 1
σ
)
+
1
σ (− 1) log
(
α (1 + τx)
−(−1) +
(
dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α) (1 + τy)−(−1)) .
Denote α (1 + τx)
−(−1)+
(
dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α) (1 + τy)−(−1)asD (Z, τx), and
then take derivatives w.r.t. τx:
dZ/dτx
Z
=
1
σ (− 1)
− (− 1)α (1 + τx)− + dZ/dτx (1− σ) dI (1 + τy)− Z−σ (λ − 1) (1 + τy)−(−1)
D
,
which can be further simplified as:
σ
dZ
dτx
=
(
−α (1 + τx)− + dZ
dτx
1− σ
− 1 dI (1 + τy)
− Z−σ (λ − 1) (1 + τy)−(−1)
)
Z
D
,
(
σ − 1− σ
− 1 dI (1 + τy)
− Z−σ (λ − 1) (1 + τy)−(−1) Z
D
)
dZ
dτx
= −α (1 + τx)− .
We can see that dZ/dτx < 0 if and only if
σ − 1− σ
− 1 dI (1 + τy)
− Z−σ (λ − 1) (1 + τy)−(−1) Z
D
> 0, (A4)
and if σ = 1/, i.e., 1− σ = 0, this condition is satisfied.
First, let us consider the case that σ is small, such that 1 − σ > 0. Notice that the
LHS of equation A4 is continuous in σ, so we know that if σ < 1/ but not far, it is still
possible that that expression is greater than 0 and dZ
dτx
< 0. Formally speaking, given any set
of parameters, ∃υ such that ∀σ ∈ (1/− υ, 1/), dZ/dτx < 0. In this region, as Z decreases,
yi and Y , which are proportional to Z
1−σ, also decrease.
A-2
Second, let us consider the case that σ is large, such that 1 − σ < 0. In this case, the
LHS of equation A4 is always positive and we know for sure that dZ/dτx < 0. Moreover, yi
and Y increase because 1− σ < 0.
Proof of Result 3
First, a decrease in 1+τy
1+τx
while Z staying constant, implies that τx increases and τy decreases,
because from equation A3, we can see that if τx increases and Z stays constant, then it must
be that τy decreases. In this case, innovation I
∗ = α + dI (1 + τi)
− Z1−σ increases. So X
decreases, as we can see from
X := α
(
(1 + τx)

−1ψ
qx
)−
Z1−σ, (A5)
and Y increases, as we can see from
Y := (I∗ − α)
(
(1 + τy)

−1ψ
λqy
)−
Z1−σ + (1− I∗)
(
(1 + τy)

−1ψ
qy
)−
Z1−σ, (A6)
given that λ > 1.
Similarly, we can prove the results for qx
qy
. If qx decreases, to keep Z constant, then qy
must increase, if other policies stay constant, as we can see from the following expression of
Z:
Z =
(∫ α
0
qix
−1

i di+
∫ 1
α
qiy
−1

i di
) 
−1
=
(
αqx
(
(1 + τx)

− 1ψ
)−(−1)
+ ((I∗ − α)λ + 1− I∗) qy
(
(1 + τy)

− 1ψ
)−(−1)) −1
Z1−σ.
Obviously, from equation A5 and A6, we can see that X decreases as qx decrease, and Y
increases as qy increases.
Proof of Result 4
Denote the response ofX to an increase of τx asXx
.
= dX/dτx, and similarly for Y andX+Y :
A-3
Yx and XYx. Moreover, denote the responses to τy as Xy, Yy and XYy. We can construct the
policy change in the following way. First, consider increasing τx, and depending on whether
X+Y increase or decrease, choose to increase or decrease τy to offset the increase or decrease
of X + Y . Then the following three cases can happen: (1) X decreases, Y increases; (2) X
increases, Y decreases; (3) X and Y do not change. In case (1) we have already obtained the
policy. In case (2), we can just use the opposite policy, i.e., decreasing τx and adjusting τy
accordingly, and then we obtain the policy. Case (3) is not generic though and be ignored.
Proof of Result 5
First, if we increase τx, we can always reduce τy by a proper size to keep Z constant. Consider
changing tax rates from τx, τy to τx + 4τx, τy − 4τy, then according to equation (A3), Z
changes by 4:
4 = q σ(−1)
(

− 1ψ
)− 1
σ (
α (1 + τx +4τx)−(−1) +
(
dI (1 + τy −4τy)− Z1−σ (λ − 1) + 1− α
)
(1 + τy −4τy)−(−1)
) 1
σ(−1) − Z.
We can see that if 4τy = 0, then 4 < 0, while if 4τy → 1 + τy > 0, then 4 → +∞. By
the intermediate value theorem, we know that ∃4τy > 0 such that 4 = 0, i.e., Z stays
unchanged.
From the expression of innovation cutoff
I∗ = α + dI (1 + τy)
− Z1−σ, (A7)
we can see that when τy decreases while Z stays constant, I
∗ increases, i.e., innovation
increases.
Proof of Result 6
Equation (A7) shows that innovation I∗ is positively related to Z, so whether an increase in
τx results in an increase or a decreases in I
∗ is the same as whether an increase in τx results
in an increase or a decreases in Z, as stated in Result 2.
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